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Notes and Comments
Attempts in English Criminal Law
Jennifer Temkin* and Graham Zellick**
There has been no lack of attention paid to the intractable problems
surrounding the law of attempt. Interest in them has been revived in
England by the publication of the Law Commission's Working Paper
on Inchoate Offences' and by the decision of the House of Lords in R.
v. Smith2 . As these are difficulties common to all common law
jurisdictions, Canadian lawyers may be interested to learn of these
recent developments. It is proposed to concentrate here on two main
issues 3: first, what conduct constitutes an attempt and secondly, the
question of impossibility. Both are discussed in the working paper ;
Smith deals only with impossibility. Before considering these, how-
ever, it may be useful for Canadian lawyers to have some information
as to the nature of the Law Commission and the way it operates.
The Commission, a full-time statutory body created in 1965 to
keep English law under continuous review 4, is similar to the Law
Reform Commission of Canada5 . It is examining, inter alia, the
general principles of the criminal law with a view to their codifica-
tion. To this end it has set up a working party consisting of Law
Commissioners, members of the Criminal Law Revision Committee,
representatives of the Home Office and practising lawyers to prepare
working papers 6. These papers are widely circulated for comment
and criticism. They do not represent the Commission's final view,
*J. Temkin, Lecturer in Law, London School of Economics and Political Science,
University of London.
**G. J. Zellick, Lecturer in Law, Queen Mary College, University of London.
1. Working Paper No. 50 - Inchoate Offences: Conspiracy, Attempt and Incite-
ment, June 1973 (H. M. Stationery Office, London).
2. [1974] 2 W.L.R. 1., sub. nom. Haughton v. Smith, [1973] 3 All E.R. 1109.
3. Other matters discussed include the mental element in attempt, attempts which
are successful, penalties, and a defence of withdrawal.
4. Law Commissions Act 1965.
5. Law Reform Commission Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 23.
6. There have been three earlier working papers by the working party on general
principles of the criminal law: The Mental Element in Crime (W.P. No. 31); Parties,
Complicity and Liability for the Acts of Another (W.P. No. 43); and Criminal
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nor do they necessarily have its approval. Reactions to each paper are
considered and the Commission itself prepares a formal report em-
bodying its own recommendations, including a draft bill, which is
presented to the Lord Chancellor, laid before Parliament and pub-
lished 7.
What Constitutes an Attempt
When do acts not culminating in a criminal offence amount to an
attempt to commit that offence? There must, of course, be the
necessary mental element; but that alone is insufficient to impose
criminal liability. There must also be some conduct. The question
then arises: how far must the defendant go in seeking to commit his
crime before he is guilty of an attempt? To find an answer to that
question has long been an objective of criminal lawyers. Not that
there has been any shortage of proferred answers: the "first stage"
theory; the "final stage" theory; the "unequivocal act" theory; the
"on the job" test; the "proximity" rule. All have been found
wanting in one way or another; only the "proximity" rule - it is
rather a rule than a test - has survived as a general guide. The
working party point out that no abstract test has been evolved for
determining whether an act is sufficiently proximate to the offence to
be an attempt, so that it is impossible to know with any precision
when there is that proximity which is required. Indeed, many jurists
have concluded that it is impossible to fashion an abstract test capable
of producing a certain answer 8 .
The proximity test does no more than distinguish mere acts of
preparation from acts immediately connected with the commission of
the offence. Only the latter attract penal liability, but the test fails to
indicate where the line should be drawn in particular instances. As
Russell on Crime puts it: "To say that the act done must be 'suffi-
Liability of Corporations (W.P. No. 44). The fifth has just been published: Defences
of General Application (W.P. No. 55).
7. No final reports have yet been published on the general principles of the criminal
law.
8. See e.g. R. v. Roberts (1885), Dears. 539, 550per Jervis C. J.; J. F. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law vol. 2 at 224; R. v. Brown (1899), 63 J.P. 790per
Darling J.; C.S. Kenney, Outlines of Criminal Law (14th ed: Cambridge University
Press, 1933) 82; and P.R. Glazebrook, "Should We Have A Law of Attempted
Crime?" (1969), 85 L.Q. Rev. 28, 36. American views to the same effect are cited in
J. Hall, GeneralPrinciples of Criminal Law (2nd ed: Bobbs - Merrill, Indianapolis,
1960) 577-578.
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ciently proximate' 9 or that 'acts remotely leading to the commission
of the offence are not to be considered as attempts to commit it, but
acts immediately connected with it are" 0 is in fact merely to state the
problem without solving it."11 A majority of the working party reject
the test, since it has given rise to acquittals which in their view should
have led to convictions. They cite R. v. Robinson' 2, R. v.
Komaronil3 and Comer v. Bloonfield14 as instances of undersirable
acquittals.
In Robinson, a jeweller had insured his stock against theft,
concealed some on his premises, tied himself up and called for help.
He told the police that his safe had been robbed, but confessed when
the property was later discovered hidden under the safe that he had
hoped to obtain money from the insurers. His conviction for attempt-
ing to obtain money by false pretences was quashed, since the false
pretence had never been made: he had merely prepared the supporting
evidence. Similarly in Comer v. Bloomfield, the defendant, having
hidden his vehicle, enquired of the insurers whether a claim would lie
for its loss. This was held to be too remote, as he had made only a
preliminary enquiry and might not have proceeded to a formal
claim 15. In Komaroni, the defendants trailed a lorry for 130 miles
with a view to stealing it and its load. This was held to be merely a
continuous act of preparation and again not sufficiently proximate.
These cases do no more than demonstrate that courts may apply,
or misapply, the test in a manner surprisingly favourable to the
accused. They do not prove that the test is intrinsically defective. But
the working party argue: "If it is right that one of the main reasons for
a law of attempt is to allow the authorities to intervene at a sufficiently
early stage to prevent a real danger of the substantive offence being
committed, all these cases demonstrate that the present law is
unsatisfactory". 16 This law-enforcement argument is their chief
reason for urging extensions of the law 17. Yet no mention is made of
9. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, op. cit., at 93.
10. R. v. Robinson, [1915] 2 K.B. 342, 348, quoting Parke B. in R. v. Eagleton
(1855), Dears. 515, 538.
11. 12th ed., 1964 (ed. J.W.C. Turner), vol. 1 at 182.
12. [1915]2 K.B. 342.
13. (1953), 103 L.J. 97; see (1954), 104 L.i. 211.
14. (1971), 55 Cr. App. R. 305.
15. Cf. R. v. Button, [1900] 2 Q.B. 597.
16. Para. 73.
17. J. C. Smith and B. Hogan, CriminalLaw (3rd ed.: Butterworths, London, 1973)
198, also recognizes the difficulty of the police in this respect, citing R. v. Mills,
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the large number of cases where the result would be regarded as
satisfactory; or of those decisions as favourable to the Crown as these
three cases seized on by the working party are to the accused'". To
have selected just these three cases- one of which, Komaroni, is not
fully reported and is so obscure that it is not cited in any of the leading
books - on which to support their entire thesis is a highly suspect
way of proceeding.
There is always virtue in precision in the criminal law, and not
just from the point of view of enabling the police to move in at exactly
the right moment. It must be admitted, however, that the vagueness
of the proximity rule does not necessarily work hardship to the
accused, since he must not only have a guilty mind but have taken
steps towards achieving his goal. The usual arguments for certainty in
the criminal law do not, therefore, apply so stringently in this area,
for the defendant knows full well that he is engaged in an unlawful
pursuit. 19 The true reason for circumspection here is to avoid convict-
ing the person who would not in fact have gone the whole way in any
event but might have resiled from the final act. We need to be
satisfied, in Glanville Williams' phrase, of his "constancy of
purpose".20 Mere acts of preparation do not unequivocally designate
a potential criminal who is truly a threat to the community, at the time
or in the future, although there is no indication that such a considera-
tion carried any weight with the working party. Recognition of this
led to the development of the unworkable "equivocality test" in New
Zealand, 2 L ephemeraly adopted in England.22
[196311 Q.B. 522 andR. v.Lawson, [1959]Crim. L. Rev. 134 as illustrations. But
Mills is not about attempt at all and Lawson not only shows the needs to maintain the
distinction between preparatory and proximate acts but also seems to have applied it
sensibly. While the police may have been in some difficulty in Lawson, it is by no
means certain that an act of gross indecency with the child was in contemplation.
18. See e.g. R. v. Button, supra, note 15;Jones v. Brooks (1968), 52 Cr. App. R.
614.
19. This point is also made by R. Buston, [1973] Crim. L. Rev. 651, 665.
20. Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed: Stevens, London, 1961) 631.
21. The theory was first propounded by Salmond in his Jurisprudence (6th ed.:
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1920) 346 and applied by him inR. v. Barker, [1924]
N.Z.L.R. 856. It was discarded by the Crimes Act, N.Z. 1961, s. 72(3) restating the
ordinary proximity rule.
22. It was first taken up in England by Dr. Turner in "Attempts to Commit Crimes"
(1934), 5 C.L.J. 230 and found its way into Russell and Kenny of which Dr. Turner
was editor, although he later modified the theory: see Russell on Crime (12th ed.:
Stevens, London, 1964) vol. 1, at 184; Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (18th ed.,
1962) 98. It was given impetus when Archibold's Pleading, Evidence and Practice
in Criminal Cases (33rd ed.: Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1954, at 1489) adopted it,
Attempts in English Criminal Law 585
Take, for example, an enraged husband who, having learned of
his wife's adultery, seizes a knife from the kitchen drawer and makes
straight for her lover's house. Many perfectly respectable persons
may have done this, or something comparable, with every intention
of committing the crime; yet long before the arrival at the lover's
house, the rage has subsided, the criminal intent evaporated, the
constancy of purpose eroded. Can it be said that such a person was at
some point along the line guilty of attempted murder? The law would
be not only absurd but oppressive if it answered affirmatively. The
way to discourage persons from arming themselves with knives in
public places is to create specific substantive offences such as posses-
sing offensive weapons, and that of course is precisely what is
done. 23 There is no need to invoke the law of attempt. Often, also,
that other inchoate offence, conspiracy, will be appropriate.
Precision would be attained by wholly abandoning the distinc-
tion between preparatory and proximate acts and making punishable
any overt act evidencing a criminal intention, as the law originally
did, 24 but the working party wisely reject so wide an extension.
Instead, the majority favour the "substantial step" test - it is hardly
a "theory" - found in the Australian Territories Draft Criminal
Code25 and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.
26
They concede that "the words 'substantial step' are not words of
much precision in themselves, nor do they relate the closeness of the
step to the commission of the crime"; and also that "the adoption of
the test would cast very much wider the net by which acts preceding
the commission of an offence would be brought within the operation
of the criminal law".27
That the "substantial step" formula is no less imprecise than
any which have gone before is evinced by the Australian draft code,
leading to some judicial approval in Davey v. Lee, [ 1968] 1 Q.B. 336 and Jones v.
Brooks (1968), Cr. App. R. 614. Archibold is alone in continuing to assert that the
test as modified still represents English Law: 38th ed., 1975, Para. 4105 at 1551. For
its defects, see Williams, op. cit., Para. 202 and J. C. Smith, [1967] Crim. L. Rev.
358. The theory was early rejected in Canada: see e.g. R. v. Cline [1956] O.R. 539; 4
D.L.R. 480.
23. The Prevention of Crime Act 1953. The unlawful carrying of firearms is
punished by the Firearms Act, 1968.
24. See Glazebrooke, op. cit., at 29 et seq. See also R. v. Gurmit Singh, [196612
Q.B. 53.
25. Ss. 52-53. Set out in App. E. to the working paper.
26. Proposed Official Draft (1962), 501 (1) (c), (2). Set out in App. F to the paper.
27. Para. 75.
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for in describing the circumstances constituting a substantial step it is
expressly declared that "conduct constituting mere preparation for
the commission of an offence may, according to the circumstances,
amount to a substantial step".28 Examples, not designed to be ex-
haustive, then follow:
29
(a) lying in wait for, searching out or following the contemp-
lated victim of the intended offence;
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of
the intended offence to go to the place contemplated for its
commission;
(c) reconnoitring the place contemplated for the commission
of the intended offence;
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in
which it is contemplated that the offence will be commit-
ted;
(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission
of the offence which are specially designed for such
unlawful use, or which can serve no lawful purpose in the
circumstances;
(f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be
employed in the commission of the offence, at or near the
place contemplated for its commission, where such pos-
session, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose
in the circumstances;
(g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct con-
stituting an element of the offence.
The Model Penal Code uses exactly the same examples.
30
Several of these, (a) and (c) for example, would clearly be merely
preparatory acts in English and Canadian law such as to exclude
liability. The working party observe that this may be said to penalise
conduct which is too remote from a contemplated offence and comes
close to punishing mere intent. The majority feel, however, "that
these possible disadvantages are outweighed" 31 by the convictions
that would result in cases like Robinson and Comer v. Bloomfield.
Such a result, however, is no answer to the uneasy feeling generated
by the proposal: it is no reassurance to those who fear that the sweep
of the law will be too wide to answer that a few undesirable acquittals,
if indeed that is what they are, would be avoided when that was
manifestly at the cost of an unknown number of undesirable and
unwanted convictions. The working party tacitly recognise this,
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statute as ensuring that "preliminary steps only, which are not
substantial, are not held to be attempts".
32
It is curious that the phrase "substantial step" commends itself
so strongly, since the working party state explicitly that they wish to
see merely preliminary steps excluded while the Australian code
explicitly includes them. But then, on examining the examples which
the working paper lists, no such distinction is apparent. The two
codes are followed so closely, with but minor modification, that it
cannot be said that "preliminary steps only" do fall outside its ambit,
unless that concept has been given a fresh and unarticulated meaning
very much narrower than the one to which we are accustoned.
The illustrations given in the working paper provide the only
guide to the proposed test, which apparently defies either analysis or
definition. Indeed, no attempt is made at either. What is more, the
examples themselves are not intended to be exhaustive descriptions
of what may amount to a substantial step. The working party are
content with this since it would be for the judge to decide whether the
particular acts alleged constituted a substantial step and to direct the
jury accordingly. Where the judge is to derive guidance, in the
absence of any conceptual framework, is not specified. The working
party admit that the expression "substantial step" is "not ideally
clear". 33 In fact, is it not so lacking in precision as to be virtually
meaningless? At least the proximity rule supplies the somewhat
rough and ready starting point of excluding merely preparatory acts.
The "substantial step" test does, however, find favour with the
learned editors of Archbold who commend it enthusiastically: "This
theory has the advantages of making it tolerably clear to the police at
what stage they may intervene, of being easy for a judge to adopt in
directing a jury, and of being easy to understand, and it remains a
question whether ultimately English law will adopt this principle." ,34
It is to the examples, then, that we must turn to divine the majority's
thinking.
There are eight illustrative situations, as follows: 3 5




34. 38th edn., 1973 (ed. T.R.R. Butler and S. Mitchell), Para. 4106, at 1552. See
also R. Buxton, "The Working Paper on Inchoate Offences: (1) Incitement and
Attempt" [1973] Crim. L. Rev. 656, 665-668.
35. Paras. 79-87.
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(b) Lying in wait for, searching out or following the contemp-
lated victim or object of the intended offence.
(c) Enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of
the intended offence to go to the place contemplated for its
commission.
(d) Reconnoitring the place contemplated for the commission
of the intended offence.
(e) Unlawful entry upon a structure, vehicle or enclosure, or
remaining thereon unlawfully for the purpose of commit-
ting or preparing to commit the intended offence.
(f) Acquiring, preparing or equipping oneself with materials
to be employed in the commission of the offence, which
are specially designed for such unlawful use or which
serve no lawful purpose in the circumstances.
(g) Preparing or acting a falsehood for the purpose of an
offence of fraud or deception.
(h) Soliciting any person, whether innocent or not, 36 to en-
gage in conduct constituting an external element of the
offence.
Illustration (a) would be apt to cover an indirect assault, such as
an assault on a mother for the purpose of kidnapping her child.
Illustrations (b), (c) and (d) are taken from the Australia and Model
Penal Codes, the only modification being the addition of the word
"object" in (b) so as to cover a vehicle as in Komaroni. Illustration
(e) is similar to the two codes except that it is widened to include a
person who unlawfully hides in a building after it has been closed in
order to steal and to cover a situation in which it is not intended to
commit the offence in the place in question, as where a person enters
a room adjacent to a bank for the purpose of tunnelling into the bank.
Illustration (f) is an amended amalgam of (e) and (f) in the
Australian draft code, where the emphasis is on mere "possession",
which the working party dislike. This category would include, for
example, acquisition of a pen for the purpose of forgery or of matches
for arson "where the circumstances provide ample evidence of why
the materials were acquired" .37 This graphically illustrates the extent
to which this new test would extend the law, 38 and how dangerously
close it comes to punishing any overt act. The enraged and betrayed
36. The solicitation of a non-innocent agent is expressly included here, although it
now amounts only to the offence of incitement, in order to avoid the defendant's
being acquitted solely because the Crown, having charged an attempt, cannot prove
the agent's innocence. It would not give rise to a conviction in circumstances not
presently amounting to one inchoate offence or another.
37. Para. 83.
38. For example, inR. v. Taylor (1859), 1 F. & F. 511, Pollock C.B. thought that
buying matches with intent to commit arson would not be sufficiently proximate. Cf.
Gurmit Singh, supra, at note 24.
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husband hypothesised earlier would be caught by this provision and
turned into a criminal even before he had emerged from his own
house. The other difference from the Australian code is the addition
of the words "equipping oneself with", designed to cover the situa-
tion where both "acquisition" and "possession" are inappropriate
because the person proposes to commit a crime with an object already
in his possession. Again, the taking of the kitchen knife provides an
illustration.
Illustration (g) is specifically intended to deal with cases like
Robinson and Comer v. Bloomfield. Even if substantial steps were
taken in those cases, this illustration goes further. Suppose the
defendant in Comer v. Bloomfield had merely concealed his vehicle
but had not yet made even his preliminary enquiry of the insurers.
This would still satisfy the illustration, but it is far from clear that
liability should be imposed in circumstances so remote from the
commission of the offence.
The need to improve the present test is beyond argument, 39 but
the difficulties involved are formidable, as the working paper unin-
tentionally reveals. Whether the present test is entirely discredited
because a few decisions are aberrant remains questionable and is
certainly not justified in the paper. Without any definition or state-
ment of purpose, it is difficult to know what the majority think the law
ought to accomplish in this field, beyond enabling the police to
intervene at the right moment. But what is the right moment? While
much impressive thought has clearly gone into the detail of the
illustrations, the paper is weak in developing the reasoning that has
produced them.40 Perhaps a more rigorous base would have emerged
had the arguments of the minority been fully set out, requiring the
majority to justify their case more cogently.
Many of these reservations seem to be entertained by the Law
Commission itself. In a brief introduction to the working paper, the
Commission realise that the proposal would very likely be controver-
sial. They note that the fact that the proposed test would allow
conviction in cases like Robinson does not demonstrate that it is in
itself satisfactory. Admitting the imprecision of the present law, the
Commission point to what they regard as its two valuable features:
39. For a thorough analysis and devastating critique of the "perpetration" test, as it
is called in Scotland, see G. H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (Green &
Sons, Edinburgh, 1967) 161-167.
40. A different and very favourable view of the paper's quality, however, is
expressed by Buxton, op. cit.
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one, that it requires a distinction between acts of preparation and acts
constituting an attempt; and two, that it is for the jury to determine
whether the conduct is sufficiently proximate.
4' They conclude: 42
"If, as has been suggested,43 the whole question of what conduct
amounts to an attempt must be decided as a matter of common sense
in each particular case, it is for careful consideration whether the
definition of an attempt can be better formulated than in terms of
adequate proximity by a properly instructed jury." However, any
failure by the working party to persuade the Commission that the
substantial step test is the answer need not be taken as a final
confirmation that the present law is incapable of improvement. It
would indeed be sad if that were so and we were left for all time with a
test with which no one in recent years save the Law Commission itself
was happy. Yet it is idle to seek to formulate a verbal test until we
have determined what stage in any sequence of actions leading
towards the commission of a crime ought to justify both police
intervention and conviction; and that is as much a moral as a legal
enquiry.
Attempting the Impossible
It has been unclear for some time whether the man who tries to steal
his own umbrella, to handle goods which he wrongly believes to be
stolen or to shoot his friend with a pistol which turns out to be a toy
can be convicted of attempt in an English court. Recently, there have
been two discussions of the conflict in the authorities. The House of
Lords in R. v. Smith and the Law Commission's working party have
arrived at very different conclusions, however.
Prior to these endeavours, a distinction was commonly drawn
between four different types of impossibility: (1) Where the
defendant's failure was due to insufficiency of means, as where he
tried to poison his victim with an inadequate quantity of cyanide, he
would be criminally liable. (2) Where there was what was sometimes
referred to as a physical impossibility arising otherwise than through
an insufficiency of means, the defendant's liability was once again
assured. Typical examples of this class of impossibility were where
41. SeeR. v. Cook (1964), 48 Cr. App. R. 98. The view beforeCook was that it was
a matter for the judge: see e.g. Archibold (35th ed., 1962), Para. 4105; Russell on
Crime, op. cit., vol. 1 at 178.
42. Op. cit., at viii.
43. Smith and Hogan, op. cit., at 198.
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the defendant tried to steal a ring from an empty pocket or to shoot
into an empty room believing his victim to be there. In R. v. Mac-
phersonaa and R. v. Collins,45 it was held that there could be no
liability in such circumstances, but these decisions were overruled in
R. v. Ring4 6 and similarly rejected in Canada. 47 (3) Where the
defendant intends to commit a non-existent crime, as where a male
over 21 intends to have sexual relations with another consenting male
adult believing this to be a criminal offence. There was universal
agreement that there could be no liability for attempt in this situation.
(4) What was known as legal impossibility where the defendant was
able to put into effect his exact intentions but by a stroke of good
fortune and contrary to his own expectations, he had not and could
not have committed a crime in any case. A common example of this
type of case which constantly appeared in the case law and was in fact
the situation in Smith was where the defendant had every intention of
receiving stolen goods and took proximate steps towards or managed
to obtain possession of them. It would then transpire that the goods
had been returned to lawful possession and had consequently ceased
to be stolen. It was this final class of impossibility which had led to
conflict in the case law. In R. v. Percy Dalton, 48 R. v. Donnelly49 and
R. v. McDonough, 50 it was held that there could be no liability,
whilst in R. v. Millar and Page51 andR. v. Crispin and Curbishley
52
the opposite was held.
Conflict in the case law was matched by disagreement among
academic writers as to the proper scope of the law. Professor J. C.
Smith53 had argued forcefully in favour of the Dalton approach on
two main grounds. First, that where a man has accomplished all that
he set out to achieve and the law has not declared such conduct to be
an offence, it is not appropriate for his conduct to be converted into a
crime by the law of attempt. If a gap in the law is thereby revealed,
what is called for is further legislative provision. Secondly, in such
44. (1857), Dears. & B. 197.
45. (1864), 9 Cox C.C. 497.
46. (1892), 17 Cox C.C. 491.
47. See for example, R. v. Scott, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 257.
48. (1949), 33 Cr. App. R. 102.
49. [1970] N.Z.L.R. 980.
50. (1962), 47 Cr. App. R. 37.
51. (1965), 49 Cr. App. R. 241.
52. (1970), 55 Cr. App. R. 310.
53. "Two Problems in Criminal Attempts" (1957), 70 Harv. L. Rev. 422; "Two
Problems in Criminal Attempts Re-examined" [1962] Crim. L. Rev. 212.
592 The Dalhousie Law Journal
circumstances, the defendant's actions cannot properly be described
as an attempt. They neither sound like nor resemble an attempt since
the defendant has succeeded in his purpose. Professor Glanville
Williams, 54 on the other hand, had argued equally forcefully that
where the defendant's intentions were criminal and he took action
towards their implementation, he should be guilty of attempt. To try
to sub-divide this category into legal and factual impossibility and
distinguish between them so far as criminal liability was concerned
was, he argued, neither logically nor socially justifiable.
In Smith in the Court of Appeal, 55 the decision in Percy Dalton
was upheld and the defendant's conviction was quashed. In the view
of Lord Widgery C. J., it would be wrong to charge a defendant with
an attempt where he had accomplished everything he had set out to
accomplish. (Smith had actually taken possession of the goods.) The
offence of attempt, it was held, presupposed a failure to execute one' s
purpose and it ought not to be made use of in order to impose liability
upon persons whose conduct had not infringed the law. The problem
raised by this rationalisation is that it leaves open the question of
whether there ought to be liability where the defendant does not
accomplish all that he set out to do, though he takes proximate steps
in that direction, but where even had he done so, his actions would
not have amounted to a crime: for example, if Smith had taken
proximate steps towards receiving the goods without actually manag-
ing to do so.
However, such doubts were dispelled by the House of Lords
which upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal and took the
opportunity to offer a further exposition of the law. The main speech
was delivered by Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L.C., who
adopted the sixfold classification of attempts suggested by Turner J.
in the New Zealand case of R. v. Donnelly.56 The four classes of
impossible attempts mentioned above are covered by categories 4, 5
and 6 of this classification. Category 4 is described as covering
situations where the attempt fails through inefficiency, ineptitude or
insufficient means. Hence, it includes attempts which fail not only
through impossibility (lack of means) but also those which fail for
other reasons. In Lord Hailsham's view, category-4 defendants ought
to be liable for attempt.
54. "Criminal Attempt - A Reply" [1962] Crim. L. Rev. 300.
55. [1973) 2 All E.R. 896.
56. [1970] N.Z.L.R. 980, 990-991.
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It is in the approach to category-5 defendants that the judgment
becomes controversial and goes further in restricting liability than
any academic opinion would allow. Turner J.'s fifth category covers
those cases in which the defendant finds that "what he is proposing to
do is after all impossible - not because of insufficiency of means,
but because it is for some reason physically not possible, whatever
means be adopted". It was the view of the whole House that
Macpherson and Collins had been correctly decided, Ring having
been decided without full reasons.
57
Lord Hailsham provided some further examples of situations
which would come within category 5 and exclude liability for at-
tempt. He instanced the defendant who shot at a wax image of an
individual he intended to kill; who administered a glass of pure water
to his victim believing it to contain cyanide; and who attempted to
"assassinate" a corpse or a bolster in a bed, believing it to be the
living body of his enemy. Turner J.'s sixth category was "legal
impossibility" and covered attempts to commit non-existent crimes.
The House held that Percy Dalton had been correctly decided and
there could be no liability in these situations. Moreover, the decision
in Curbishley and Crispin was expressly disapproved, thus determin-
ing the issue left open by Lord Widgery in favour of excluding
liability where the defendant's unaccomplished purpose would not, if
completed, have been an offence. The House of Lords has thus
favoured a very different approach from the one taken by the Cana-
dian Criminal Code.
58
The Lord Chancellor did, however, suggest that the defendants
might instead have been charged with conspiracy. The working party
point out that the problem of impossibility must affect all the inchoate
offences alike and that liability ought to depend upon the same
principles. It is not to be supposed that the Lord Chancellor does not
share this view. On the facts in Smith, the defendants formed an
agreement to handle the stolen property some time before it was
intercepted by the police; hence, at the time of the commission of the
offence of conspiracy, there was no question of impossibility.
57. The House similarly expressed disapproval of R. v. Brown (1889), 24 Q.B.D.
357.
58. S.24(1) reads: "Everyone who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or
omits to do anything for the purpose of carrying out his attention is guilty of an
attempt to commit the offence whether or not it was possible under the circumstances
to commit the offence."
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The working paper, which had declared itself in favour of the
so-called subjective approach,5 9 was not followed by the House of
Lords. The man who is through circumstances unable to carry out his
criminal designs is as morally guilty, as dangerous and as deserving
of punishment as the man whose project is unclouded by impossibil-
ity. Hence the working party favour the imposition of liability in most
impossibility situations, the only exception being where the defen-
dant is mistakenly under the belief that his intended actions will
infringe the criminal law when the law does not cover such activity at
all; for example, where the defendant, a male over 21, believes that it
is a criminal offence to have sexual relations with another consenting
male of the same age.
The working party have chosen to achieve this result by a
formulation which they evolved after considering a series of typical
examples of impossibility situations. It is submitted that the working
party's aims could have been realised far more effectively and simply
by adopting section 24 of the Canadian Criminal Code which would
seem clearly to articulate the principle at issue in a way that the
working party's formulation utterly fails to do. The working party's
proposals are as follows:
60
(i) A person may be guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
notwithstanding that the means by which the crime is
intended to be committed would in fact be inadequate for
the commission of the crime.
(ii) A person may be guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
notwithstanding that -
(a) the person in respect of whom the crime is intended
to be committed is dead, does not exist or does not
possess a characteristic which the person believes
him to possess (necessary for the crime);
(b) the property in respect of which the crime is in-
tended to be committed does not exist or does not
possess a characteristic which the person believes it
to possess (necessary for the crime);
(iii) Save as aforesaid a person is not guilty of an attempt to
commit the crime if he could not commit the crime con-
templated owing to the non-existence of an element re-
quired by law for that crime;
(iv) The principles outlined in (i), (ii) and (iii) should apply
also to incitement and conspiracy.
Several examples are provided of situations which the above is
intended to cover: (A) The defendant, intending to kill P, fires a
59. Para. 129.
60. Para. 136.
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number of bullets into the bed in which he believes P to be sleeping.
In fact P is (1) behind the wardrobe, or (2) in the next room, or (3)
even in another country. 61 (B) The defendant shoots at a stump
wrongly believing it to be a man. 6 2 In fact, it is arguable that A (1)
and (2) are not impossibility situations at all, but, assuming that they
are, it is difficult to see how either A or B fits within the classifica-
tion. The chief reason for this appears to be the confusion which runs
throughout the paper on the difference between the presence and the
existence of a person or object. Example A is described in the
working paper as involving persons who do not exist; yet this is
clearly not the case. They do exist, but they are not present at the right
time or place. The question remains how A and B are to be dealt with,
since they also fall outside paragraph (iii), which relates only to
situations apart from those mentioned in paragraphs (i) and (ii) where
the impossibility is due to the non-existence of an element required by
law for that crime. The classification itself provides no answer to this.
There is clearly a danger in permitting examples to determine a
classification. Where a slightly different factual situation arises, it
cannot be guaranteed to cope and inconsistency is a likely result.
Finally, the working party is forced to concede that its proposals,
owing to their "extreme breadth of operation", are capable of caus-
ing injustice and that it will therefore be for the police and the courts
to use their discretion to avoid this!
63
But perhaps the principal objection to the working paper is its
failure adequately to advert to the crucial question of what our penal
system can do about people with dangerous thoughts which cannot in
the circumstances possibly be translated into criminal action. It is
clear that, as far as the working party is concerned, the resolution of
problems of substantive law is not to be impeded by consideration of
matters of penology. However, once it is proposed to deal with
people on the basis of their intentions, it is hard to remain aloof from
the fact that our penal system has manifestly failed to cope with the
individuals brought within it. It is true that in certain circumstances
dangerous men have to be kept from the successful execution of their
plans, as where there is an intent to murder or to do serious harm to a
specific individual. In such cases, however, there will be no need to
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have committed some lesser substantive offence. 64 It is not even as if
punishment in these circumstances can serve the interests of general
deterrence, since no-one plans to attempt the impossible. Arguably,
therefore, the only end to be served here is retribution. It is submitted
that recognition of the limitations of our penal system should make us
very wary of imposing punishment upon those whose actions could
not in the circumstances have brought about the state of affairs the
law seeks to prevent. The decision in Smith is thus a welcome one in
that it insists upon upholding the fundamental principle of the crimi-
nal law that there must be a criminal act as well as a guilty mind, for,
in the words of Lord Reid, "to punish people for their guilty intention
[would be to introduce] a radical change in the principles of our
law".65
64. See e.g. supra, at note 23.
65. [197313 All E.R. 1109, 1121.
